

Mainstream America's Silence: The Racialization of Arab Americans
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Since 9-11, the state of civil liberties in this nation has deteriorated noticeably for all Americans. In particular, new legislation passed immediately after 9-11 undermined Arab American perceptions of security in this country. The PATRIOT Acts I and II grant the government significant powers to monitor Americans, even allowing the indefinite detention of “noncitizens,” and these new powers have been selectively applied—most noticeably to Arabs and Muslims. In the interests of national security, non-immigrant residents are now required to register under newly the implemented NSEER System (National Security Entry and Exit Registry), and non-compliance constitutes a violation punishable by deportation. Although NSEERs first initially targeted people from countries of origin in the Muslim world, these provisions have now expanded to include most visitors from across the globe. Yet, in the immediate weeks and months after 9-11, these policies singled out Muslims and created a wave of fear and anxiety among visitors and immigrants from Muslim-majority countries. In fact, thousands of people who feared arrest because of visa irregularities sought asylum in Canada (Murray, 2004). During the past several years, US government agents have made over 1,200 “special interest” arrests, such as those conducted under the power of the PATRIOT Acts and NSEERS program. Despite the antiterrorist rhetoric of this legislation, however, none of those 1,200 were ever directly linked to the September 2001 attacks. The vast majority of individuals arrested were eventually cleared of the crimes alleged to them, though it took eighty days for the FBI and the CIA to do so.

Although the stipulations in the PATRIOT Acts and other Department of Justice decrees ostensibly apply to all Americans, they effectively single out Arab and Muslim Americans. As Louise Cainkar comments, “Ashcroft has already removed more Arabs and Muslims (who were neither terrorists nor criminals) from the US in the past year than the total number of foreign national deported in the infamous Palmer raids of 1919.”¹ Expanded secret evidence procedures are used to keep Arabs under arrest, and more legal provisions for the intelligence community result in FBI interrogations at Arab community centers, religious institutions, and community functions across the nation

With post 9-11 government scrutiny, a wave of anti-Arab backlash ensued. Passengers refused to board airplanes with apparently Arab individuals; mosques were burned and vandalized. In 2003, the Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR) reported that hate crimes were up at least 300% from 2001. “The violence, discrimination, defamation and intolerance now faced by Arabs in American society have reached a level unparalleled in their 100-year history in the US,” reports Cainkar.² These new patterns of legislation have created fear and anxiety in the Arab American community. A vast majority of Arabs are feeling levels of anxiety in the US. According to a Zogby poll conducted in 2002, 66% of all Arabs worry more about their futures in this country, and 81% feel that their community is under profiling.

Exacerbating the sense of Arab American vulnerability is mainstream American public opinion. In fact, by September 18, 2001, one week after the attacks, more than

¹ Cainkar, Louise. “Targeting Muslims, at Ashcroft’s Discretion,” *Middle East Report*. March 14, 2003. See also: Howell, Sally and Andrew Shryock. “Cracking Down on Diaspora: Arab Detroit and America’s War on Terror.” *Anthropological Quarterly*, Summer 2003

² Cainkar, Louise. “No Longer Invisible: Arab and Muslim Exclusion after September 11,” *Middle East Report*. Fall, 2002.

96,000 calls to the FBI were made about “suspicious” Arab and Muslims in the US.³ In the immediate days after the attacks, the majority of Americans, according to Gallup polls, were in favor of profiling Arabs. Over 60% of Americans in the Detroit Metro area—an area notable for its large Arab and Muslim population—were and are still willing to infringe on the civil liberties of ordinary Arab and Muslim Americans. This majority supports increased government surveillance of Arabs and Muslims; it advocates giving the police broad power to stop, search, and detain any Arab or Muslim at random—even where there is lack of evidence to prosecute. This backlash granted the US government extended authority and a groundswell of popular support to further promote policies that clash with basic American freedoms and rights.

Why is there so much support for policies so apparently anathematic to basic American values? Several hypotheses can plausibly explain support for removing Arab American civil protections, ranging from a general sense of vulnerability to more specific anti-Arab attitudes and predispositions. While the former can be explained away as general fear and worry in the aftermath of the attacks, the latter, this paper argues, is far more troubling. For if the general American population is willing to support infringements on civil liberties by reason of misperceptions that characterize Arabs and Muslims as “enemy others,” then we must also address the larger phenomenon of the racialization of Arabs and Muslims in mainstream American culture. This racialization process essentially see Arabs as different than and inferior to whites, potentially violent and threatening, and therefore deserving of policies that target them as a distinct group of people and criminalize them without evidence of criminal activity. The binary logic of

³ Murray, Nancy. “Profiled: Arabs, Muslims, and the Post-9/11 Hunt for the ‘Enemy Within,’” *Civil Rights in Peril: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims*. (ed) Elaine Hagopian. Michigan: Pluto Press, 2004.

“us” verses “them,” based on a constructed myth of racial difference, permeates U.S. society and provides the lenses through which group differences are organized, imagined, and understood. In the case of the denial of Arab American civil liberties, unequal access to civil liberties is justified through a racial logic that is, on the one hand, not based specifically on an association between phenotype and backwardness, but on the other hand, is in continuity with various histories of racism in the U.S. In the case of Arabs and Muslims the sub-group is also seen as violent, potentially threatening, and deserving of discrimination.

The single most durable explanation of widespread support for civil liberty infringement, I argue, rests on the racialization of Arab Americans as enemy Other. Here, I use the term “racialization” to describe the perception and production of an inherent threatening difference between “us” and “them” that provides a scaffold legitimating and supporting the violation of the sub-group’s civil liberties. Although racialization has its roots in domestic politics, the findings of this paper demonstrate that geo-political realities also shape the ways average Americans construct images of the Arab and Muslim Other. Both domestic politics and existing geo-political realities combine to justify the domestic subordination of less tolerated populations, especially when the homelands of those populations are sites of US military campaigns.

The Civil Liberties Debate and Arab and Muslim Americans:

The civil liberties debate has raised vital questions that strike at the core of debates on democracy and tolerance. The American willingness to give up civil liberties

could be seen to derive from an intense feeling of individual and collective vulnerability. Many believe that, for the sake of security and the continuation of democracy, we should reasonably give up some civil liberties. For Arab Americans, however, the debate on civil liberties after 9-11 is of more instrumental concern. If legislation that singles out Arab Americans continues to be passed with widespread acceptance, then there may be no end in sight. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the sources of support for such infringements, whether such infringements are given up for a larger good or taken away preemptively. Several explanations of support for these civil liberties infringements have been advanced both in general and for Arab Americans more specifically.

Arguably, there are different reasons why people support infringements on civil liberties. One set of explanations draws from party identification as “Democrat” or “Republican,” and ideological commitment as “liberal” or “conservative.” It has been argued that liberal ideologues tend to hold civil liberties to be inalienable rights for all. Conservative ideologues, on the other hand, tend to view civil liberties as rescindable because of the value placed on “security,” respect for authority, obedience, and the law (McClosky and Brill, 1983 and McClosky 1964).

Perceptions of threat are another crucial factor explaining support for civil liberties infringements. A wealth of literature demonstrates that those individuals who feel most personally threatened are most likely to protect themselves. As Davis and Silver indicate, the response to such perceived threats may become “overwhelmingly intolerant” (Davis, 1995 and Davis and Silver, 2004). Further, others find that those who perceive future threat are more likely to support even extreme anti-terrorism policies domestically (Huddy, Feldman, Taber and Lahav, 2005; Herrman and Visser, 1999; and Jentleson,

1992). This sense of threat not only leads to an increased toleration for civil liberties violations, but it also increases prejudice against the suspected group (Bettencourt et al. 2001; Levine and Campbell 1972; Struch and Schwartz 1989). Anxiety and threat are powerful tools in the way the War on Terror is fought.

An alternative explanation focuses on racial motivations. According to this logic, Americans in favor of the infringing Arab American civil liberties, for example, do so because they hold negative views about an entire people. These negative views are fed by a variety of misperceptions and stereotypes. The Arab American has been popularly constructed as an “Enemy Other” long before 9-11 represented Arabs and Muslims as irrational, terror-supporting, die-hard fanatics. American foreign policy has consistently justified intervention in the Arab world along similar lines. When our leaders characterize the Arab and Muslim world as inherently undemocratic due to fundamental value differences between “us” and “them,” they buttress an environment of intolerance at home. Thus, the racialization of Arab and Muslim Americans—a process decades in the making—also explains the overwhelming support for the infringement of Arab and Muslim civil liberties (Moallem, XXX).

This paper moves beyond the narrow phenotypical definition of racialization, wherein race relations are strictly structured by biological differences. Rather, this paper adopts a larger definition of racialization that incorporates the process of “othering.” This process of “othering” is based on assumptions about culture and religion instead of phenotype. The racialization of Arabs and Muslims stems from two intertwined processes.

First, in a society that is already constructed along racial lines—any perceived difference between the dominant mainstream and a minority “other” tends to be subjected to the same framework that racism is built upon. This “othering” process lends itself to the *already existing* paradigm of defining oneself vis-à-vis other groups along the lines of racial categories. This form of racism is not contingent on difference in appearance but also on differences in cultural attributes. More problematic for Arabs and Muslims however is that these differences are exacerbated by popular discourses and the national government, especially after the events of 9-11, which deem this sub-population an “enemy other.”

The loyalties of the Arab and Muslim communities have consistently been questioned since the attacks. Only 38% of Americans in the Detroit metro area believe that Arabs and Muslims are doing all that they can to fight the war on terror. Muslims and Arabs across the US are consistently asked to apologize for 9-11, as if they were behind the attacks. And yet, ironically, the numerous and countless condemnations emanating from mosques and organizations in the US which emphatically denounce the attacks have received little media attention. Americans remain suspicious of Arabs and Muslims. When asked whether Arabs could be trusted, Americans in the Detroit metro area ranked Arabs as the least trustworthy sub-population. 20% of Americans have little or no trust for other whites; 24% have little or no trust for blacks, and 30% have little or no trust for Arabs. Not only are Arabs and Muslims different, but they are a threat treated with great suspicion. Because they are not only different but originate from the Middle East, they are also presumed to be operating “against us.”

The binary construction of “us” versus “them” is not new to American social relationships in the US or abroad. Racial relations in the US have been constructed through the binary lens of the dominant and the subordinate. We can trace this history to race relations in this country. Likewise, the lens through which America sees the rest of the world tinted with this dichotomy; “we,” whoever and wherever “we” are, enjoy both cultural and moral superiority. Such interactions with “others” abroad translate into a racial logic in a US context that views group differences vis-à-vis racial lenses at home. Therefore, in a racially divided society, the process of othering, be it based on pheno-type or cultural difference, lends itself to racialization, particularly when it involves essentialism, and the attributing essentializing cultural differences to the nature of the *entire* group. The racialization of Arabs and Muslims, however, draws on yet another element of difference. Not only are they different at home, but their difference is exacerbated by geo-political realities where the US has utilized the construction of the Other as enemy-terrorist to justify its campaigns abroad.

The second process of racialization involves the direct subordination of the minority Other. The very process of rendering the other inferior to white Americans is at the heart of racialization. In the case of Arab Americans, the way that Otherness is determined is through a process by which the dominant social group claims moral and cultural superiority in the process of producing as essentialized, homogenous image of Arab Americans as non-Whites who are naturally, morally, and culturally inferior to whites. Terrorism, according to this logic, is not the modus operandi of a few radical individuals, but a by-product of a larger cultural and civilizational heritage: the Islamic Other.

In Omi and Winant's words, racialization is "a matter of both social structure and cultural representation." Cultural representations of Muslims and Arabs derive from an American media regime that has vilified this population for decades, and from a social structure that believes in and resorts to the rhetoric of moral superiority to justify its intervention in the Middle East and its discrimination of Arab Americans.⁴ Racialization is not static but is produced, reproduced, and solidified in a variety of forums: family networks, religious institutions, government offices, and even schools (Coates, 2004). Since "immigrant America" is a conglomeration of these "subordinate" minority groups, these perceptions of "other" manifest themselves in the daily interactions that govern the incorporation of minority groups into the mainstream. In this regard, the incorporation of minority groups is not only about the acquisition of necessary language tools and specific, technical labor skills; it is also about confronting one's place in the context of US racial hierarchies.

The racialization of Arabs and Muslims has involved a process of juxtaposing the Other with and separating the Other from dominant mainstream culture. This process did not begin with 9-11, though those events galvanized it. Susan Akram discovers this process in the "deliberate mythmaking" tactics of film and media, in the polemical stereotyping strategies of "experts" on the Middle East, in the selling of a foreign policy agendas, and in "a public susceptible to images identifying the unwelcome 'other' in its midst" (Akram, 2002). A long history of misrepresentation and the promotion of violent stereotypes mark the popular American media; Arab and Muslim Americans were

⁴ In the words of Rodney Coates, these depictions that "other" entire sub-groups is commonplace in American popular culture. "Evidence seems to support the vilification of racial nonelites. Blacks and Hispanics [for example] are more likely to be presented as criminals than as victims or more positively (Chiricos and Eschholz, 2002). These types of perceptual biases have dire consequences when racialized minorities confront the legal system (Berger, 2002).

portrayed as terrorists long before 9-11.⁵ Muslims and Arabs are consistently absent from that desirable group of “ordinary people, families with social interactions, or outstanding members of communities such as scholars or writers or scientists.” This process of demonization, Akram goes on to say, “has been so complete and so successful that film critics, most Americans and social commentators have barely noticed” (Akram, 2002). In fact, since the 1960s the US has unofficially classified Arabs as terrorists and perceived them as threats to National Security (Hassan, 2003).

The racialization of Arab and Muslim Americans captures the ways in which the dominant social structure of this country has positioned itself vis-à-vis this sub-population. In fact, Americans have come to know and learn about Islam and Arabs through the prisms of terrorism and barbarism. It is no surprise that 42% of Americans in the Detroit metro area believe that 9-11 was a result of a deeply rooted disrespect for democracy, freedom, and the rights of women. A good percentage of Americans clearly believe that there is a fundamental clash of values between “us” and “them.” Simply put, the US was attacked because it is fundamentally “good,” while the other is fundamentally “evil.” These perceptions of the ‘other’ have shaped post 9-11 discussions and introspective deliberations. Even in our attempts to understand, we still claim moral superiority. Hence we ask the question: “why do they hate us?” Seldom has the question been asked, “Why do *we* hate them?” And why have we always considered Arabs and Muslims a threat to our values? These perceptions of “other,” I argue, are a by-product of

⁵ See Michael Suleiman. “Stereotypes, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Impact on Arab-American Relations,” *Journal of Arab Affairs*. April, 2002; M. Nabil. “The Arabs Image,” *World Press Review*. June 1986; Daniel Mandel. “Muslims on the Silver Screen,” *Middle East Quarterly*. Spring 2001; Mark Tessler and Dan Corstange. “How Should Americans Understand Arab Political Attitudes: Combating Stereotypes with Public Opinion Data from the Middle East,” *Journal of Social Affairs*, Winter 2002; Jack Shaheen. “Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Villifies a People,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. July, 2003; Fawaz Gerges. “Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. July, 2003.

the racialization patterns of Muslims and Arabs in the US. This pattern of racialization, I posit, explains why the general American population is willing to do away with the civil liberties of Muslims and Arabs in this country. Racialization explains support for the removal of Arab and Muslim American civil rights. In fact, racialization occurs as Arab and Muslim American civil rights are removed; in such infringements, we are witnessing the continual production of “Arab” as a violent and threatening race.

Data and Test

I use data gathered in 2003 as part of the Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS). The DAAS was produced through an intensive collaboration between the University of Michigan, the University of Michigan-Dearborn, and an advisory panel of community representatives from over twenty secular, religious, and social service organizations.⁶ The DAAS is a representative survey of all adults (18 years and older) of Arab or Chaldean descent who resided in households in Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties during the six-month survey period, July to December 2003. Between July and November 2003, 1016 face-to-face interviews were conducted. Seventy-three percent of those who were asked to participate in the survey did so. All references to “Arabs and Chaldeans” in this report refer to that population. In addition, 508 members of the general adult population in these three counties were interviewed during roughly the same period through the Detroit Area Study (DAS). This is a representative sample of the Detroit area population, referred to in this report as the “general population.” About 85 percent of the questionnaire items are common to both surveys, permitting extensive comparison of the two populations. Analysis performed in this paper will rely on the DAS data.

In order to test my argument, I construct two logit models below. The first model examines the factors associated with Americans who support the infringement of civil liberties for members of the *general* population. The dependent variable asks respondents whether they are willing to infringe on the rights of the *general* population. It is an index variable and consists of three questions. The first question asks whether the respondent supports an increase of surveillance of the general population by the US government. The second question asks whether the respondent would support giving the police more power

⁶ Research team members are Wayne Baker, Sally Howell, Amaney Jamal, Ann Chih Lin, Son Stockton and Mark Tessler.

to search anyone at random. And finally, the last question asks whether the interviewee supports detaining suspicious individuals even if there is insufficient evidence to prosecute. The second dependent variable asks specifically about the respondent's willingness to infringe on the civil liberties of *Arab and Muslim Americans*. This, too, is an index variable consisting of three questions. The first question asks whether a respondent would support the increased surveillance of Arab and Muslim Americans; the second question, whether he or she would support giving the police more powers to stop and search anyone who looks Arab or Muslim; and the third, whether those surveyed support the detaining of suspicious Muslims and Arabs even when there is insufficient evidence to prosecute. The scores were aggregated such that any affirmative response was given a code of 1, while 0 indicates that the respondent would not favor any civil liberty violation of either the general population or Muslim or Arabs. 75% of the DAS would favor reduced civil liberties of the general population, while 63% of the DAS would favor restrictions on Arab American rights.

Several independent variables are included in the equation to test the overall hypotheses put forward. To capture anxiety and perceptions of threat, I include a variable that gauges individual level of security after the attacks. The questions ask: "How much—if any—have the events of 9/11 shaken your own personal sense of safety and security? Have they shaken it a great deal, a good amount, not too much, or not at all?" To capture ideological inclinations, I include measures of party identification: whether a respondent identifies as democrat or republican. I also include a measure of conservative/liberal leanings. The question asks: "Thinking politically and socially, how would you describe your own general outlook—as being very conservative, moderately

conservative, middle-of-the-road, moderately liberal, or very liberal?” Finally, I include a set of variables that serve as plausible explanations for the 9-11 attacks. Two of the explanations describe the results as related to either US foreign policy in the region or the acts of a few extremist believers. The other two measures address the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis. The first asks whether there is a religious conflict between Islam, on the one side, and Christianity and Judaism, on the other. The last question asks whether respondents believe that the attacks occurred because the US supports democracy, freedom, and the rights of women. Finally, I also include several demographic variables to gauge whether basic demographic patterns explain support for civil liberties infringements. In the model are controls for education, income, age, and gender. I also include a measure of exposure to the news in the aftermath of 9-11 to gauge whether media consumption is associated with a willingness to infringe on the civil liberties of the general population as well as of Arab and Muslim Americans.

Table 1: Logit Regressions on Support for Civil Liberties Infringements: General Population and Arab Americans (Robust Standard Errors)

		Supports Civil Liberties Infringements for	
		General Population	Arab and Muslim Populations
DEMOGRAPHICS	Gender	.777** (.327)	.031 (.327)
	Education	-.057 (.333)	-.212 (.301)
	Income	.043 (.070)	-.016 (.065)
	Age	-.003 (.009)	-.003 (.008)
IDEOLOGY	Liberal/Conservative	-.044*** (.163)	-.207 (.144)
	Republican	.250 (.480)	-.039 (.353)
	Democrat	-.372 (.341)	-.157 (.302)
	Religious Conflict	-.313 (.293)	.265 (.253)
	Clash of Values	.426 (.313)	.455** (.255)
	US Intervention	-.223 (.320)	-.411 (.260)
	A few Extremists	.758** (.392)	-.175 (.371)
SAFETY/ SECURITY	Personal Sense of Security Shaken	.255 (.308)	.104 (.269)
RELIGION AND ATTENDANCE	Protestant	-.454 (.389)	.764** (.333)
	Catholic	.366 (.441)	.664* (.342)
	Religious Attendance of Church	-.181 (.113)	-.127 (.090)
NEWS EXPOSURE	Follow News	.161* (.095)	-.091 (.077)
	N	365	369

*Significant at the .10 level
 **Significant at the .05 Level
 *** Significant at the .01 level

The most interesting pattern that emerges from the above analysis is the inconsistency between those supporting civil liberties infringements for the general population and for members of the Arab and Muslim population. When examining the factors linked to support of the civil liberties infringements of the general population, one notes that gender is important. More women than men are likely to support reducing civil liberties for security. This is a phenomenon well documented after 9-11; the term “security moms” has become part of our cultural jargon (Lawrence, 2005). In fact, many people speculated that George Bush won a significant amount of 2004 votes from women who were concerned about security issues. The model also finds that more conservatives than liberals are likely to support the civil liberties infringements of the general population. This indicates that ideology does indeed play a factor in determining whether citizens are willing to grant government more powers to infringe on basic liberties. Liberals are less likely to support these infringements. Personal security and whether respondents were shaken by the events of 9-11 is not significant in this model. Finally, respondents who both believe that the attacks of 9-11 were committed by a few extremists and who had more exposure to the media about 9-11 also support a reduction in civil liberties. The clash of civilization indicators—religious conflict and value clash—are not pertinent here. In sum, ideology plays an important factor in explaining support for civil liberties infringements. And although personal security is insignificant, those who have been exposed to more media about 9-11 support more civil liberties infringements. Perhaps media exposure, which has often been blamed for instilling fear about the possibility of future attacks, explains this observed pattern of support. Further, those who believe that the 9-11 attacks were the actions of a few extremists support civil

liberties infringements of the general population. Perhaps they believe that decreased liberties are a good way to guarantee security from those extremist elements.

When turning to the factors that explain support the civil liberties infringements of Arab and Muslim Americans, one notes a different pattern of support among the general American population in the Detroit Metro Area. Those Americans willing to support reduced rights for Arabs and Muslim are more likely to be Protestant or Catholic, and they are more likely to believe that there is an inherent clash of values between the US and the Muslim world. None of the ideological variables or factors that gauge personal security are significant here. Ideology and gender explain support for the civil liberties infringement of the general population, while the clash of values hypothesis explains support for the civil liberties infringements of Arab and Muslims; clearly, the population has different ideas about civil liberties when it comes to Arabs and Muslims. While the former demonstrates what conventional wisdom tells us—women moreso than men, and conservatives moreso than liberals are willing to do away with civil liberties—the findings on Arabs and Muslims are more troubling. Here it appears that those people who believe that the US was attacked because of a clash of values are more likely to encourage reduced rights for Arab and Muslim Americans. These respondents, who seem most comfortable with constructions of “us” and “them,” are willing to do away with the civil liberties of Arabs and Muslims That both Protestants and Catholics are willing to curb Arab and Muslim civil liberties further illustrates that perceived differences explain this pattern of support. Religious denomination was not at all significant in the model that gauged support for civil liberties infringements of the general population. Yet, when the target group is Arab and Muslim, Protestants and Catholics (who constitute 70% of the

DAS sample, and mainstream religious denominations) are more willing to reduce their civil liberties.

These patterns of responses raise the most concern among the general US Arab and Muslim population. It was found in a Zogby survey in 2002 that 66% of Muslim Arab Americans worry about their futures in the US. If the dominant culture sees them not only as different but also as a threat, as adhering to a value system which strikes at the core of “American values,” then it is all the more acceptable to do away with their civil rights. Since the attacks of 9-11, hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims in the US have consistently been on the rise year after year (CAIR). The racialization of Arabs and Muslims by the mainstream, decades in the making, finds its manifestation after 9-11 in these results. The media and the national government have long portrayed this sub-group as a population that one should guard against. The general population, these results show, is following suit.

The Racialization of Tolerance

The disturbing findings above, however, have also paved the way for an opportunity. While worrying about the presence the “other” in their midst, Americans are also attempting to learn more about this population. Since 9-11, copies of the Quran have been quickly leaving bookstores across the country. Interfaith dialogues and mosque open-houses, which strive to teach general Americans about Islam, became more common features after the attacks. In fact, a third of the DAAS respondents reported that they received an act of solidarity or kindness from a member of the general population.

Though Americans remain wary, they also seek tolerance for the Arab and Muslim “other.”

Yet, tolerance and the discourse on tolerance are not void of the context in which tolerance is either granted or withdrawn. The very fact that Muslims and Arabs are rallying Americans to be more tolerant illustrates a conundrum surrounding the issue of toleration itself. Some Arab and Muslims have accepted racial profiling, claim to understand lengthy interrogations as their children stand by at airports, and apologize over and over for 9-11 because they feel this self-subjugation will win tolerance from their mainstream counterparts. However, tolerance assumes equality and good faith in interactions. It also assumes that dominant forces—media, religion, government, and so on—are not operating to espouse intolerance against a certain population. In the end, tolerance is granted by elite members of the dominant mainstream which is united in its culture and values towards a subordinate other. In the words of Herbert Marcuse, tolerance is “determined and defined by the institutionalized inequality (which is certainly compatible with constitutional equality)... In such a society, tolerance is de facto limited on the dual ground of legalized violence or suppression (police, armed forces, guards of all sorts) and of the privileged position held by the predominant interest and their connections” (Marcuse, 1964). He goes on to say, “In the United States, this tendency goes hand in hand with the monopolistic or oligopolistic concentration of capital in the formation of public opinion, i.e. the majority.” Essentially, tolerance is a tool of racialization.

Whether tolerated or rejected, the construction of the Other is similar. We can take great pride in our toleration of those who do not share our values. Or we can take

great pride in resisting accommodation because others don't share our values. In the end, the construction of the "other" is the same. Whether tolerated or resisted, the "other" is, for the general population, always that which is different. This element of difference—and the ways it is constructed and manifested—defines how tolerant we are. The process of racialization is inherent in our toleration of the other. Rather than look for the commonalities that unite all humankind, we erect differences, and applaud our tolerance, or justify our intolerance. Thus, concentrating the debate on whether Arab and Muslims are worthy of civil liberties protections is the wrong place to start. The racialized symptomatology of constructing Arabs and Muslims as "enemy others" needs to be addressed. As Rodeny Coates reminds us, "one does not treat the symptoms of smoking by curing the cough" (Coates, 2004). Unfortunately, Arabs and Muslims possess neither the resources, nor the power, nor the media necessary to alter mainstream public opinion. The tides of public opinion continue to operate against them.

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DATA APPENDIX:

- 1) Gender: Male or Female
Coding: 1: Male; 2: Female
- 2) Education:
Coding: 1: Less than High School; 2: High School; 3: Some College; 4: BA;
5: Professional Degree
- 3) Age:
Coding: 1: 18-24; 2: 25-57; 3: 58+
- 4) Household Income:
Coding: 1: >19,999; 2: 20,000-49,999; 3: 50,000-74,999; 4: 75,000+
- 5) Republican: Generally, speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent or what?
Coding: 1 Republican; 0: All Else
- 6) Democrat: Generally, speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent or what?
Coding: 1 Democrat; 0: All Else
- 7) Liberal/Conservative: Thinking politically and socially, how would you describe your own general outlook—are you very conservative, moderately conservative, middle-of-the-road, moderately liberal, or very liberal?
Coding: 1: Very Conservative; 2: Moderately Conservative; 3: Middle of Road; 4: Moderately Liberal; 5: Very Liberal
- 8) Protestant: Are you Protestant, Catholic, or Orthodox Christian?
Coding: 1: Protestant; 0: Other
- 9) Catholic: Are you Protestant, Catholic, or Orthodox Christian
Coding: 1: Catholic; 0: Other
- 10) Religious Attendance:
Not including weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? Do you attend every week or more often, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times per year, or less often than that?
Coding: 1: Every week or more; 2: almost every week; 3: once or twice a month; 4: A few times a year; 5: Less often than that
- 11) Follow 9-11 events/Media:

Since 9/11, how closely have you been following the news about the "war on terrorism" -- very closely, closely, a little, or not much at all?

Coding: 1: Very Closely; 2: Somewhat Closely; 3: A Little; 4: Not Much at All

12) Explanations for 9-11:

Now I'll read you some possible explanations for the terrorist attacks on 9/11. For each one, please tell me whether you think this is a possible explanation or not. Just answer yes or no.

- a. US Intervention: It's because of the U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf.
- b. Extremist Beliefs: It's because of the extremist beliefs of a few terrorists.
- c. Religious Conflict: It's because of the conflict between Christianity and Judaism on one side and Islam on the other.
- d. Clash of Values: It's because the U. S. believes in democracy, freedom and equal rights for women.

Coding: 1: Yes; 2: No

13) Personal Security shaken by events of 9-11

How much—if any—have the events of 9/11 shaken your own personal sense of safety and security? Have they shaken it a great deal, a good amount, not too much, or not at all?

Coding: 1: A Great Deal; 2: A Good Amount; 3: Not too Much; 4: Not at All

14) Civil Liberties: General Population:

- a. Do you support increasing surveillance of US citizens by the government? [Response Options: Yes or No]
- b. Do you support: Giving the police powers to stop and search anyone at random? [Response Options: Yes or No]
- c. Do you support detaining some suspicious individuals even if there is not sufficient evidence to prosecute them in the courts? [Response Options: Yes or No]

Note: Any "Yes" response Coded as Yes=1

15) Willingness to Give up Civil Liberties of Arab Americans:

Index Variable consisting of the following three questions:

- a. Do you support increasing surveillance of Arab Americans by the government? [Response Options: Yes or No]
- b. Do you support: Giving the police powers to stop and search anyone who appears to be Arab or Muslim, at random? [Response Options: Yes or No]
- c. Do you support detaining some suspicious Arabs and/or Muslims even if there is not sufficient evidence to prosecute them in the courts? [Response Options: Yes or No]

Note: Any "Yes" response coded as Yes=1.